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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 
No. 231.-OcTOBER TERM, 1924. 
Hidemitsu Toyota, 
vs. 
United State of America. }
On Certificate from the United 
States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit. 
[May 25, 1925.] 
Mr. Justice BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Hidemitsu Toyota, a person of the Japanese race, born in Japan, 
entered the United States in 1913. He served substantially all the 
time between November of that year and May, 1923, in the United 
States Coast Guard Service. This was a part of the naval force 
of the United States nearly all of the time the United States was 
engaged in the recent war. He received eight or more honorable 
discharges, and some of them were for service during the war. May 
14, 1921, he filed his petition for naturalization in the United States 
district court for the distric,t of Massachusetts. The petition was 
granted, and a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. 
This case arises on a petition to cancel the certificate on the ground 
·that it was illegally procured. § 15, Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3592, 
34 Stat. 596, 601. It is agreed that if a person of the Japanese 
race, born in Japan, may legally be naturalized under the seventh 
subdivision of § 4 of the Act of June 29, 1906, as amended by 
the Act of May 9, 1918, c. 69, 40 Stat. 542, or under the Act 
of July 19, 1919, c. 24, 41 Stat. 222, Toyota is legally natural-
ized. The district court held he was not entitled to be naturalized, 
and entered a decree canceling his certificate of citizenship. 290 
Fed. 971. An appeal was taken to the Oircuit Court of Appeals, 
and that court under § 239, Judicial Code, certified to this court 
the following questions: (1) Whether a person of the Japanese 
race, born in Japan, may legally be naturalized under the seventh 
subdivision of § 4 of the Act of June 29, 1906, as amended by the 
.A.ct of May 9, 1918, and (2) whether such subject may legally be 
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naturalized under the Act of July 19, 1919. The material provi-
sions of these enactments are printed in the margin.• 
Until 1870, only aliens being free white persons were eligible 
to citizenship. In that year, aliens of African nativity and per-
sons of African descent were made eligible. See Ozawa v. United 
States, 260 U. S. 178, 192. The substance of prior legislation is 
expressed in § 2169, R~vised Statutes, w.hich is : '' The provisions 
*''Seventh. Any native-born Filipino of the age of twenty-one years and 
upward who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United 
States and who has enlisted or may hereafter enlist in the United States 
Navy or Marine Corps or the Naval Auxiliary Service, and who, after service 
of not less than three years, may be honorably discharged therefrom, or who 
may receive an ordinary discharge with recommendation £or reenlistment; or 
any alien, or any Porto Rican not a citizen of the United States, of the age 
of twenty-one years and upward, who has enlisted or entered or may here-
after enlist in or enter the armies of the United States, . or in the 
United States Navy or Marine Corps, or in the United States Coast Guard, 
or who has served for three years on board of any vessel of the United States 
Government, or for three years on board of merchant or :fishing vessels of 
the United States of more than twenty tons burden, and while still in the 
service on a reenlistment or reappointment, or within six months after an 
honorable discharge or separation therefrom, or while on furlough to the 
Army Reserve or Regular Army Reserve after honoraible service, may, on 
presentation of the required declaration of intention petition for naturaliza-
tion without proof of the required :five years' residence within the United 
States if upon examination it :ui shown that such residence cannot 
be established; any alien serving in the military or naval service of the 
United States during the time this country is engaged in the present war may 
:file his petition for naturalization without making the preliminary declaration 
of intention and without proof of the required :five years' residence within the 
United States; § 2 . Nothing in this Act shall repeal or in 
any way enlarge section twenty-one hundred and sixty-nine of the Revised 
Statutes, except as specified in the seventh subdivision of this Act and under 
the limitation therein defined: '' (Act of May 9, 1918, c. 69, 40 Stat. 
542, 547.) 
'' Any person of foreign birth who served in the military or naval forces 
of the United States during the present war, after :final examination and ac-
ceptance by the said military or naval authorities, and shall have been honor-
a,bly discharged after such acceptance and service, shall have the benefits of 
the seventh subdivision of section 4 of the Act of June 29, 1906 as 
amended, and shall not be required to pay any fee there£ or; and this pro-
vision shall continue for the period of one year after all of the American 
troops are returned to the United States." (Act of July 19, 1919, e. 24, 41 
Stat. 222.) 
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of this Title [Naturalization] shall apply to aliens being free 
white persons, and to aliens of African nativity and to persons of 
African de cent." A person of the Japanese race, born in Japan, 
is not eligible under that section. Ozawa v. United s·tates, supra, 
198. 
It has long been the rule that in order to be admitted to citizen-
ship, an alien is required, at leas tw-0 years prior to his admission, 
to declare his intention to become a citizen, and to show that he 
has res,ided continuously in the United States for at least five 
years immediately preceding his admission. Revised Statutes, 
§§ 2165, 2170; subd. 1, § 4, c. 359•2, 34 Stat. 596'. But ,at different 
times, as to specially designated aliens serving in the armed forces 
of the United State , Congress modified and les ened these require-
ments. § 2] 66, Revi ed Statutes ( Act of July 17, 1862, § 21, c. 
200, 12 Stat. 594, 597) ; Act of July 26, 1894, c. 16'5, 28 Stat. 123, 
124; Act of June 30, 1914, c. 130, 38 Stat. 392, 395. In each of 
the first two of the e acts, the phrase ' 'any alien'' is used as a 
part of the de cription of the person for whose benefit the act was 
passed. In the last, the language is '' any alien . . . who may, 
under existing law, become a citizen of the United States." Prior 
to this act, it had been held that the phrase "any alien", used 
in the earlier acts, did not enlarge the classes defined in § 2169. 
In re Buntaro Kumagai, (1908) 163 Fed. 922; In re Knight, 
(1909) 171 Fed. 299; BesshQ v. United Stat1es, (1910) 178 Fed. 
245; In re Alverto, (1912) 198 Fed. 688. The language used in 
the Act of 1914 merely expre e what was implied in the earlier 
provi ions. 
The seventh ubdivision of_§ 4, of the act of 1918, permits "any 
native-born Filipino'' or '' any alien, or any Porto Rican not a citi-
zen of the United States'' belonging re pectively to the classes there 
described, on pre en~ation of the required declaration of intention, 
to petition for naturalization without proof of five years' residence 
within the United States; and the act permits '' any alien'' serving 
in the forces of the United States '' during the time thi country 
is engaged in the present war'' to file his petition for naturaliza-
tion without making the preliminary declaration of intention and 
without proof of five years' residence in the United States. The 
act of 1919 gave '' any person of foreign birth'' there mentioned, 
the benefits of the eventh subdivision of § 4. Evidently, a principal 
~ 
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purpose of these acts was to facilitate the naturalization of service 
men of the classes specified. There is nothing to show an intention 
to eliminate from the definition of eligibility in § 2169' the dis-
tinction based on color or race. Nor is there anything to indicate 
that, if the seventh subdivision stood alone, the words '' any alien'' 
should be taken to mean more than did the same words when used 
in the acts of 1862 and 1894. But § 2 of the act of 1918 provides 
that nothing in the act shall repeal or in any way enlarge § 2169 
'' except as specified in the seventh subdivision of this Act and 
under the limitation therein defined.'' This implies some enlarge-
ment of § 2169 in respect of color and race ; but it also indicates 
a purpose not to eliminate all distinction based on color and race 
so long continued in the naturalization laws. If it was intended 
to make such change and to extend the privilege of naturali-
zation to all races, the provision of § 2 so limiting the enlargement 
of § 2169 would be inappropriate. And if the phrase '' any alien',. 
in the seventh subdivision is read literally, the qualifying words 
"being free white persons" and "of African nativity" in § 2169 
are without significance. See In re Para, 269 Fed. 643, 6'46; Peti-
tion of Charr, 273 Fed. 207, 213. 
When the act of 1918 was passed, it was doubtful whether § 30 
of the act of 1906 extended the privilege -0f naturalization to all 
citizens of the Philippine Islands. They were held eligible for 
naturalization in In re Bautista, 245 Fed. 765, and in In re Mallari_. 
239 Fed. 416. And see 27, Op. Atty. Gen. 12. They were held not 
eligible in In re Alverio, 198 Fed. 688, in In re Lampitoe, 232 Fed. 
382, and in In re Rallos, 241 Fed. 686. But we hold that until 
the passage of that act, Filipinos not being '' free whit e persons'' 
or '' of African nativity'' were not eligible, and that the effect of 
the act of 1918 was to make eligible, and to authorize the naturali-
zation of, native-born Filipinos of whatever color or r ace having 
the qualifications specified in the seventh subdivision of § 4. 
Under the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, 
December 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, Congress was author ized to 
determine the civil rights and political status of the native in-
habitants of the Philippine Islands. And by the act of July 1, 
1902, § 4, e. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, 692, it was declared that all in-
habitants continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects 
on April 11, 1899, and then resided in the Islands, and their chil-
- --------
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dren born subsequent thereto, '' shall be deemed and held to be 
citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the pro-
tection oi the United States, except such as shall have elected 
to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain,'' according to 
the treaty. The citizens of the Philippine Islands are not aliens. 
See Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U. S. 1, 13. They owe no allegiance to 
any foreign government. They were not eligible for naturalization 
under § 2169 because not aliens and so not within its terms. By 
§ 30 of the Act of 1906, it is provided: '' That all the applicable 
provisions of the naturalization laws of the United States shall 
apply to and be held to authorize the admission to citizenship of 
all persons not citizens who owe permanent allegiance to the 
United States, and who may become residents of any State or 
organized Territory of the United States, with the following 
modifications: The applicant shall not be required to renounce 
allegiance to any foreign sovereignty; he shall make his declara-
tion of intention to become a citizen of the United States at least 
two years prior to his admission ; and residence within the juris-
diction of the United States, owing such permanent allegiance, 
shall be regarded as residence within the United States within the 
meaning of the five years' residence clause of the existing law.'' 
( 34 Stat. 606.) 
Section 26 of that act repeals certain sections of Title XXX 
of the Revised Statutes, but leaves § 2169 in force. It is to be 
applied as if it were included in the act of 1906. Plainly, the 
element of alienage included in § 2169 did not apply to the class • 
made eligible by § 30 of the act of 1906. The element of color and 
race included in that section is not specifically dealt with by § 30, 
and, as it has long been the national policy to maintain the dis-
tinction of color and race, radical change is not lightly to be 
deemed to have been intended. "Persons not citizens who owe 
permanent allegiance to the United States, and who may become 
residents of any State" may include Malays, Japanese and Chinese 
and others not eligible under the distinction as to color and race. 
As under § 30 all the applicable provisions of the naturalization 
laws apply, the limitations based on color and race remain; and 
the class made eligible by § 30 must be limited to those of the color 
and race included by § 2169. As Filipinos are not aliens and owe 
allegiance to the United States, there are strong reasons for re-
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!axing as to them the restrictions which do not exist in favor of aliens 
who are barred because of their oolor and race. And in view of 
the policy of Congress to limit the naturalization of aliens to 
white persons and to those of African nativity the implied enlarge-
ment of § 2169 should be taken at the minimum. The legislative 
history of the act indicates that the intention of Congress was 
not to enlarge § 2169, except in respect of Filipinos qualified by 
the specified service. Senate Report No. 388, pp. 2, 3, 8. House 
Report No. 502, pp. 1, 4, Sixty-fifth Congress, Second Session. 
See also Congressional Record, vol. 56, part 6, pp. 6000-6003. And 
we hold that the words "any alien" in the seventh subdivision are 
limited by § 2169 to aliens of the color and race there specified. 
We also hold that the phrase "any person of foreign birth" in the 
act of 1919 is not more comprehensive than the words "any alien" 
in the act of 1918. It follows that the questions certified must be 
answered in the negative. 
The answer to the first question is : No. 
The answer to the second question is: No. 
The Chief Justice dissents. 
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